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Abstract
More and more academic journals adopt an open-access policy, by which articles
are accessible free of charge, while publication costs are recovered through author
fees. We study the consequences of this open access policy on a journal’s quality
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1 Introduction
The development of electronic publishing and the dissatisfaction with academic journal
price escalations has led to an increasing support for the open-access model (also called the
author-pays model), where authors pay for submitting and/or publishing their articles,
while readers can access published articles at no charge through the Internet. There are
(as of October 8, 2009) 4366 open-access journals in all fields (of which 88 in Economics)1
and open access publishing currently represents approximately 5% of the total market for
academic journals.2
The report of the Science and Technology Committee of the UK House of Commons
(House of Commons henceforth, 2004) gives an overview of issues related to author-pays
publishing: the main argument in favor of open-access is greater dissemination of re-
search findings whereas the report expresses concerns that an author-pays model may
induce authors to publish less because of problems of affordability. Along similar lines,
Dewatripont et al. (2006) recommend funding authorities to create a ‘level-playing field’
between reader-pays and author-pays models by ”allocating money to libraries to sub-
scribe to reader or library-pay journals but also to authors to pay for publication costs
in author-pay journals” (p.11). Another type of concern, which is the focus of our paper,
is that author fees may induce journal editors to accept a higher proportion of articles,
which may have negative implications for quality.3
This paper builds a model of an academic journal that fulfills a double role of certi-
fication and dissemination of knowledge and studies its pricing from a two-sided market
perspective. We aim at generating insights useful to policy makers by conducting both
normative and positive analyses. Adopting first a normative viewpoint, we show that, for
an electronic journal maximizing social welfare, open access is socially optimal because
the marginal cost of providing access to a reader is zero. If subsidizing reading were fea-
sible, it would be even optimal to do so because each reader exerts positive externalities
on the rest of society.4 An example of these externalities is development of innovations
inspired by the ideas contained in the articles. Even though authors also exert positive
externalities by publishing their articles, there is no need to subsidize authors for submit-
1See the Directory of Open-Access Journals’ (DOAJ) website (www.doaj.org).
2See House of Commons Science and Technology Committee (2004, p.73). Among major open-access
publishing initiatives, one can mention the Public Library of Science (PLoS) and BioMed Central.
3According to House of Commons (2004), “if author-pays publishing were to become the dominant
model, there is a risk that some parts of the market would be able to produce journals quickly, at high
volume and with reduced quality control .... ” (p. 81)
4This implies that open access can also be optimal for a printed journal (that has a positive cost of
dissemination) if the positive externalities exerted by readers exceed the marginal cost of dissemination
(reproduction and distribution).
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ting articles as long as they get substantial benefits from publication, while the submission
cost remains negligible.5
Then, adopting a positive perspective, we study how the move from the traditional
reader-pays model to the open access model affects a journal’s quality standard, both for
a not-for profit journal and for a for-profit journal6. We find that in both cases, but for
different reasons, the move might decrease quality below the socially efficient level. We
first consider a not-for-profit journal run by an academic association. If the objective of
the association were to maximize social welfare, the move to open access would lead to
the social optimum. However the association is likely to pursue its own objective. We
consider two possibilities for its objective: the total utility of the readers or the impact
of the journal.7 We find that the association tends to choose too high a quality standard
under the reader-pays model while it tends to choose too low a quality standard under
open access, compared with the second best level. A simple intuition can be given in
terms of internalization of costs. First, a social welfare maximizing journal internalizes
the publication cost γ(> 0) minus the author’s fixed benefit from publication u(> 0).
It is reasonable to assume γ − u > 0.8 Second, a not-for profit journal maximizing
readers’ utilities under the reader-pays model has to recover γ entirely from subscription
revenues, but it does not internalize u, which leads to publishing too few articles. On
the contrary, a not-for profit journal maximizing readers’ utilities under the open access
model internalizes neither γ (since its costs are covered with author fees) nor u, which
leads to publishing too many articles. Furthermore, this quality degradation under open
access can result in reducing the number of readers compared with the level under the
reader-pays model, if publishing too many articles induces many high-cost readers to stop
reading the journal. However, we find that as long as the number of readers is larger under
open access than under the reader-pays model, the change from the reader-pays model to
the open access model unambiguously increases social welfare. In addition, we show that
under open access, an impact-maximizing journal chooses the same quality standard (and
hence the same number of readers) as the one chosen by a journal maximizing readers’
utility.
5We focus on the dissemination of research articles and do not model the prior stage where these
articles are produced. Needless to say, subsidizing production of articles is socially desirable.
6In the price search engine on internationally published journals (www.journalprices.com), maintained
by Ted Bergstrom and Preston McAfee, 63% of 9002 journals in 11 fields are for profit journals.
7The missions stated by some not-for profit journals are ”to advance science and serve society” (Sci-
ence), “to publish highly selective, widely cited articles of current relevance” (Journal of Political Econ-
omy), “to publish original articles in all branches of economics” (Econometrica). The objectives we
consider are consistent with the above missions.
8Otherwise, it might be socially optimal to publish all articles and then the journal would not have
any certification role.
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In the case of a for-profit journal, we also find (see Appendix) that it tends to choose
too high a quality standard under the reader-pays model while it can choose too low a
standard under open access. Under the reader-pays model, publishing low quality articles
that give readers a benefit smaller than their reading cost only reduces the journal’s profit.
On the contrary, under open access, the journal does not internalize inframarginal readers’
costs of reading, as long as they are willing to read the journal. Therefore the journal
can have an incentive to publish low quality articles in order to increase its profit from
author fees. In summary, in the case of a for-profit journal, quality degradation is caused
by the non-internalization of reading costs while in the case of a not-for-profit journal
maximizing readers’ utility (and hence internalizing reading costs), quality degradation is
caused by the non-internalization of publication costs.
Our paper builds on two strands of the literature. First, it builds on the literature
on two-sided markets (see for example Rochet and Tirole, 2002, 2003, 2006, Caillaud
and Jullien, 2003, Evans, 2003, Anderson and Coate, 2005, Armstrong 2006 and Hagiu
2006). Two-sided markets can be roughly defined as industries where platforms provide
interaction services between two (or several) kinds of users. Typical examples are payment
cards, software, Internet and media. In such industries, it is vital for platforms to find a
price structure that attracts sufficient numbers of users on each side of the market. Our
paper has two novel aspects. First, in addition to choosing a price for each side, the
platform (i.e. the academic journal) can choose a minimum quality standard. Second,
the externality from authors to readers is not always positive: as the number of published
articles increases (and hence as the quality standard decreases), the net utility that a
reader obtains from the platform increases up to a maximum and then decreases.
Second, our paper builds on the literature on the economics of academic journals, that
has initially adopted a one-sided perspective, focusing on library subscriptions (McCabe,
2004, Jeon and Menicucci, 2006 and Armstrong 2009). For instance, Jeon and Menicucci
(2006) show that bundling electronic journals makes it difficult for small publishers to sell
their journals. To our knowledge, McCabe and Snyder (2005a,b, 2006, 2007) are the first
papers to study the pricing of academic journals from a two-sided market perspective.
McCabe and Snyder (2006, 2007) study pricing of academic journals under different in-
dustry structures (monopoly, duopoly, free entry) but in their model all articles have the
same quality and hence journals do not provide any certification function.9 Our model is
closer to McCabe and Snyder (2005a,b), who consider a monopoly journal providing cer-
tification services. However, there are significant differences with our approach. McCabe
and Snyder (2005a,b) take the quality standard of the journal as given (it is determined
9An exception is section 5.4 in McCabe and Snyder (2007) where they consider free entry and quality
certification and obtain a specialization result: articles of different qualities are published by different
journals.
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by the talent of its editors) and examine how this quality standard affects the subscription
price and thereby the adoption of open access.10 By contrast, we endogenize the quality
standard of the journal and study how the move from the reader-pays model to open
access affects this quality standard and the readership size of the journal.11
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model. Section 3
characterizes the first-best allocation. Section 4 characterizes the second best allocation,
defined as the one that maximizes social welfare under the constraint that reading cannot
be subsidized. Section 5 studies the policy chosen by a not-for-profit journal maximizing
readers’ utility under the reader-pays model and under open access. Section 6 performs
a comparison among four different outcomes. Section 7 considers, as robustness checks, a
hybrid model (charging both author fee and subscription price) and an impact-maximizing
journal. Section 8 concludes. Appendix includes proofs and the analysis of a for-profit
journal.
2 The model
We consider a single academic journal, modelled as a platform between a continuum of
authors and a continuum of potential readers. The mass of authors is normalized to
one. Each author has one article, which embodies “ideas” that may be useful to readers,
for example because they allow them to develop innovations. The benefit from each
innovation is not fully appropriated by the reader/innovator but also spills over to the
rest of society, including to the author herself, through peer recognition.
The only way in which authors and readers can interact is through the academic
journal.12 Three conditions are required for this interaction to occur:
• authors must submit their articles to the journal;
• the journal must referee them and publish only those that meet its quality standard;
• readers must read the published articles.
10They find that open access is more likely to be chosen by a journal with poor editorial talent.
11There are three other differences. First, they do not consider a not-for-profit journal. Second, they
consider binary support for an article’s quality. Last, they assume that every author has the same prior
belief about the quality of her article.
12This is because we assume that the average quality of the unpublished articles that are directly
accessible through Internet is so low that readers prefer to look only at published articles. The academic
journal plays thus a fundamental certification role: it filters out “junk” articles.
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Thus, in our model, the academic journal plays two crucial roles: it disseminates
academic production (i.e. articles) and certifies the quality of these articles in order to
convince readers to read the journal. Since time is costly to readers, they will indeed read
the journal only if they anticipate that the average quality of articles is good enough.
Symmetrically, the benefit that an author obtains from publication increases with the
readership size of the journal. Thus we are in a “chicken and egg” situation, characteristic
of two-sided markets, where the platform (here the academic journal) has to attract both
sides (here authors and readers) to be successful. However, by contrast with most of the
literature on two-sided markets, the platform controls not only the number of interactions
but also their quality, through its certification function.
The quality of each article is measured by a number q that is independently drawn from
the same distribution, with support [0, qmax]. We assume that the quality of an article
is privately observed by its author. The journal has a perfect refereeing technology: by
incurring a cost γR, it can perfectly observe the quality of a submitted article. Since
our focus is on electronic journals, distributed through the Internet, we assume that the
marginal cost of distribution is zero.13 The journal incurs a publication cost γP per
published article; it includes the cost of making the first (electronic) copy and any fixed
cost of distribution per article (such as the cost of buying capacity to post an article).
The journal commits to publish all submitted articles of quality q ≥ qmin, where qmin is
the minimum quality standard chosen by the journal. In addition, the journal chooses its
pricing policy. It charges pS to all submitted articles, an additional pP to all published
articles and a subscription fee pR to each reader.
Readers cannot observe the quality of an article before reading it but observe its
quality after reading it. We assume that an article’s quality cannot be verified ex post by
a third party and therefore the journal’s pricing scheme cannot be conditioned on realized
quality14.
The mass of readers is also normalized to one. All readers obtain the same expected
benefit q after reading an article of quality q but differ in their “reading cost” c, which is
independently drawn from a distribution with support included in [0,∞). Readers’ benefit
includes not only the increase in their knowledge but also the utility that they obtain from
its use (such as production of other scientific articles, patents, commercial applications).
As already mentioned, when an article is read, some utility from its potential applications
also spills over to the rest of society, including to the author herself. More precisely,
13However our arguments can also be applied to a print journal, provided the marginal cost of printing
and distributing copies is not too big.
14McCabe and Snyder (2005a,b) assume it as well. It can be justified by the fact that a Court cannot
perfectly verify the quality of scientific articles.
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when an article of quality q is published by the journal, the total (that is, monetary and
non-monetary) benefit that the author obtains is given by
u + αAqnR,
where u(> 0) and αA(> 0) are constants and nR represents the number of readers. u is
a fixed component: it corresponds to the utility from having one article published in the
journal. For instance, if a tenure decision depends solely on the number of articles pub-
lished in particular journals, a tenure-track professor derives some utility from publishing
her article in those journals, this independently of the quality of the article.15 By contrast,
αAqnR is a variable component: it depends on the quality of the article. We interpret
qnR as the impact of the article, proportional to the number of subsequent citations or to
the number of patents that are subsequently based on the article. The constant αA(> 0)
measures the strength of the relation between publication impact and authors’ utility. A
similar term αSqnR with αS(> 0) represents the benefit that spills over to the rest of
society. We denote by α = αA + αS the total externality term.
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. The journal announces its editorial policy (qmin) and its prices (pS, pP , pR).
2. Authors decide whether or not to submit their articles to the journal.
3. The journal referees all submitted articles and accepts or rejects each of them.
4. Readers decide whether or not to buy the journal and read the articles.
Since both the author and the journal perfectly observe the quality q of a submitted
article, the author perfectly knows whether or not her article will be accepted. Therefore,
if q < qmin and pS > 0, she will not submit the article. By contrast, if q > qmin, the article
will be accepted and she will have to pay the author fee pA(≡ pS + pP ). This implies
an indeterminacy between pS and pP : only pA matters. The fact that only articles of
quality superior to qmin are submitted in our model
16 also implies that what matters for
the journal is only the sum of the publication cost per article (γP ) and the refereeing cost
per article (γR), not its composition. Let γ ≡ γP + γR. We assume γ > u, implying
that even when the reading cost is zero, publishing the lowest quality article (i.e. the
one with q = 0) is not socially optimal. This assumption captures the certification role
of the academic journal: by rejecting articles of low quality, the journal allows readers to
concentrate on important articles and avoid proliferation of bad ones.
15u can also represent recognition from non-peers who do not read the journal.
16We assume however that the journal commits to effectively referee all submitted articles.
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In summary, when an article is published in the journal, its author gets a fixed utility
u while the journal incurs a fixed cost γ(> u). When an article of quality q is read by a
reader of cost c, the reader gets net utility (q − c), and the rest of society (including the
author) gets utility αq.
Each potential reader decides whether to read the journal or not, based on his expec-
tation of the quality of published articles and on his (unit) cost of reading c. If the nA
best articles are published, the net utility of a reader of cost c is:
UR = nA[Q
a(nA)− c]− pR,
where Qa(nA) is the (anticipated) average quality of the articles published in the journal.
17
This average quality can be inferred perfectly from the minimum quality standard qmin
announced by the journal. Indeed, let us denote by q(nA) the nA-th quantile of the
distribution of articles’ qualities (ranked by decreasing quality: q(·) is thus decreasing).
This distribution is supposed to be common knowledge. We have by definition:
Pr(q ≥ q(nA)) = nA, (1)
Qa(nA) =
∫ nA
0
q(x)dx
nA
, (2)
while
qmin = q(nA). (3)
Similarly the number nR of readers can be perfectly anticipated by authors, since
the distribution of readers’ costs is also supposed to be common knowledge. Let c(nR)
denote the nR-th quantile of the cost distribution (ranked by increasing cost: c(·) is thus
increasing). We have by definition:
Pr(c ≤ c(nR)) = nR. (4)
Moreover the utility of the marginal reader is zero, and thus:
nA[Q
a(nA)− c(nR)] = pR. (5)
Thus knowing qmin and pR (and the distributions of costs and qualities) each author can
infer the number nA of published articles, the average quality Q
a(nA) of these published
articles, and thus by (5) the number of readers. Figure 1 describes the journal as a
platform mediating authors and readers.
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Figure 1: The journal as a platform.
3 The first-best allocation
In this section, we derive the first-best outcome, that would be implemented by a social
planner who could choose who reads the journal and which articles are published. Obvi-
ously, if there are nA articles published and nR readers, efficiency requires that these are
the articles with the highest qualities (q ≥ q(nA)) and the readers with the lowest costs
(c ≤ c(nR)). Social welfare, denoted by W (nA, nR) is then given by:
W (nA, nR) ≡ (1 + α)nR
∫ nA
0
q(x)dx− nA (γ − u)− nA
∫ nR
0
c(y)dy. (6)
In formula (6), the first term represents social benefit (readers + authors + the rest of
society) when the nA best articles are published and read by the nR most efficient readers,
the second term represents the total cost of publishing the journal, minus the total fixed
benefit of authors and the last term represents the aggregate cost of reading the journal.
We assume that the parameters are such that the maximum of W is interior: the
proportion of published articles is strictly between 0 and 1. Then, from the first order
condition with respect to nA, we have:
(1 + α)nRq(nA) = (γ − u) +
∫ nR
0
c(y)dy. (7)
Given that the nR readers with c ≤ c(nR) read the journal, condition (7) means that the
optimal number of articles published, nA, is determined by equalizing the social marginal
17This formula presumes that the readers who subscribe to the journal read all the articles it contains.
It is indeed optimal for them to do so since the cost of reading articles is proportional to the number of
articles and articles’ qualities are indistinguishable a priori. Our analysis could be extended to the case
where partial reading can be optimal because reading cost is strictly convex in the number of articles or
because the journal signals the quality of published articles by ranking them (”lead” article).
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benefit from publishing an article of quality q(nA), i.e. (1 + α)nRq(nA), to the social
marginal cost, which is equal to the sum of the net cost of publishing an article (γ − u)
and the aggregate cost of reading an article
∫ nR
0
c(y)dy. (7) can be rewritten as:
(1 + α)q(nA) =
γ − u
nR
+ Ca(nR), (8)
where
Ca(nR) =
∫ nR
0
c(y)dy
nR
denotes the average cost of readers.
From the first order condition with respect to nR, we have:
(1 + α)
∫ nA
0
q(x)dx = nAc(nR). (9)
Given that the nA articles with quality q ≥ q(nA) are published by the journal, condition
(9) means that the optimal number of readers is determined by equalizing the social
benefit from having one additional reader to the total cost of reading incurred by this
marginal reader. (9) is equivalent to
(1 + α)Qa(nA) = c(nR). (10)
Since the externality term α is positive, condition (10) implies that for the marginal
reader, the average utility from reading an article of the journal is lower than her cost of
reading it. Thus, as we shall see below, the marginal reader should be subsidized. This is
because she generates positive externalities on the rest of society by increasing the impact
of articles and/or the number of innovations derived from them. Let
(
nFBA , n
FB
R
)
denote
the first-best allocation, characterized by (8) and (10).
We now study the minimum quality standard qFBmin and the prices
(
pFBA , p
FB
R
)
that
implement the first-best outcome
(
nFBA , n
FB
R
)
when the social planner has to satisfy the
participation constraints for both authors and readers. Obviously, qFBmin must be equal to
q(nFBA ). Given nR, let UA(nA : nR) denote the utility that the nAth author derives from
publishing her article in the journal. We have:
UA(nA : nR) = αAq(nA)nR + u− pA. (11)
In order to induce the submission of all articles of quality superior to q(nFBA ), the following
constraint must be satisfied:
(PCA) UA(n
FB
A : n
FB
R ) = αAq(n
FB
A )n
FB
R + u− pA ≥ 0;
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which is equivalent to
pA ≤ αAq(nFBA )nFBR + u ≡ pmaxA .
Given nA, let UR(nR : nA) denote the utility that the nRth reader derives from sub-
scribing to (and reading) the journal. We have:
UR(nR : nA) = [Q
a(nA)− c(nR)]nA − pR. (12)
In order to align each reader’s incentive to subscribe to the journal (and to read it)
with the social incentive (i.e. in order to induce only those with c ≤ c(nFBR ) to subscribe
to the journal), the following incentive constraint18 has to be satisfied for the marginal
reader:
(ICR) UR(n
FB
R : n
FB
A ) =
[
Qa(nFBA )− c(nFBR )
]
nFBA − pR = 0,
which is equivalent to
pR =
[
Qa(nFBA )− c(nFBR )
]
nFBA ≡ pFBR .
From (10), we have
pFBR = −αQa(nFBA )nFBA < 0. (13)
Therefore pFBR must be strictly negative. By contrast, p
FB
A can be strictly positive: this
is because an author derives a strictly positive utility from publishing her article in the
journal but incurs no submission cost. This implies that charging a small (but positive)
price is compatible with the submission of all articles of quality higher than q(nFBA ). In
fact, any pA ≤ pmaxA achieves it. By contrast, each reader must incur a cost of reading the
journal. Since reading generates positive externalities to the rest of society, it is optimal
to subsidize readers by charging a subscription price that is lower than the marginal
distribution cost. For an electronic journal, this distribution cost is zero, so that the
subscription price must be negative. Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 1 (First-best) (i) The first-best allocation
(
nFBA , n
FB
R
)
is characterized by:
(1 + α)q(nA) =
γ − u
nR
+ Ca(nR),
(1 + α)Qa(nA) = c(nR).
(ii) To implement the first-best allocation, the social planner has to choose a minimum
quality standard equal to qFBmin ≡ q(nFBA ) and prices
(
pFBA , p
FB
R
)
satisfying
pFBA ≤ αAq(nFBA )nFBR + u ≡ pmaxA ; pFBR = −αQa(nFBA )nFBA .
Therefore, the subscription price must be strictly negative.
18We call it an incentive constraint instead of calling it a participation constraint since a participation
constraint is usually defined by an inequality.
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4 The second-best allocation
In the previous analysis of the first-best allocation we have made the somewhat implausible
assumption that the social planner could induce a marginal reader of type c(nFBR ) to read
the journal by subsidizing it. However, charging a negative subscription price would not,
in practice, necessarily induce the marginal reader to read the journal. This is because it
is hard to monitor whether or not someone effectively reads the journal. Consequently, a
negative subscription price would induce fake readers who have no or very weak interest
in reading the journal to subscribe to it only to obtain the subsidy. Therefore, we consider
here the second-best outcome in which the social planner is constrained to charge a non
negative subscription price (pR ≥ 0).
Given pR, the marginal reader is determined by
UR(nR : nA) =
∫ nA
0
q(x)dx− c(nR)nA − pR = 0.
Therefore, requiring pR ≥ 0 is equivalent to requiring
c(nR)nA ≤
∫ nA
0
q(x)dx. (14)
Hence, in the second best outcome, the social planner maximizes W (nA, nR) subject to
(14). Again we assume that the parameters are such that in the (second-best) optimum,
the proportion of published articles is strictly between 0 and 1. Define LSB = W −
λ1
[
c(nR)nA −
∫ nA
0
q(x)dx
]
where λ1(≥ 0) represents the Lagrange multiplier associated
with (14). The first-order conditions with respect to nA and nR are:
(1 + α)nRq(nA) = (γ − u) +
∫ nR
0
c(y)dy + λ1 [c(nR)− q(nA)] ; (15)
(1 + α)
∫ nA
0
q(x)dx = nAc(nR) + λ1c
′(nR)nA. (16)
When condition (14) binds, we find from (16)
λ1 =
αc(nR)
c′(nR)
> 0.
Inserting λ1 =
αc(nR)
c′(nR)
into (15) gives
(1 + α)nRq(nA) = (γ − u) +
∫ nR
0
c(y)dy +
αc(nR)
c′(nR)
[c(nR)− q(nA)] (17)
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The fact that (14) binds implies that
c(nR) = Q
a(nA). (18)
In other words, the marginal reader’s reading cost is equal to the average quality of
the articles published in the journal. This, together with Qa(nA) > q(nA) implies that
when we compare (7) with (15), the social marginal cost of publishing one more article is
larger in the second-best allocation than in the first-best (this is because the additional
term λ1 [c(nR)− q(nA)] is positive). Similarly, comparing (9) with (16) shows that the
social marginal cost of having one more reader is larger in the second-best than in the
first-best. Let
(
nSBA , n
SB
R
)
denote the second-best allocation, characterized by (17) and
(18). The previous arguments imply that nFBA > n
SB
A and n
FB
R > n
SB
R , at least if W is
quasi concave. These inequalities will be established formerly in Section 6, in the case of
iso-elastic distribution functions.
Let
(
pSBA , p
SB
R
)
denote a price vector implementing
(
nSBA , n
SB
R
)
when the social planner
chooses the quality standard qSB ≡ q(nSBA ). Since (14) binds, we have pSBR = 0. Therefore,
open-access is second-best optimal. pSBA has to satisfy the participation constraint of the
marginal author, implying :
pSBA ≤ αAq(nSBA )nSBR + u.
Proposition 2 (Second-best) When a negative subscription price is not feasible:
(i) Open-access is socially optimal.
(ii) In this case, the second-best allocation
(
nSBA , n
SB
R
)
is characterized by (17) and
(18). In particular, the marginal reader’s cost is equal to the average quality of published
articles.
(iii) If W is quasi-concave in (nA, nR) then the second-best allocation involves less
publications and less readers than the first-best: nSBA < n
FB
A and n
SB
R < n
FB
R .
Proposition 2 characterizes the situations where open-access is optimal: when the pos-
itive externalities generated by readers (for instance through the innovations derived from
academic articles) exceed the cost of distributing articles (which is zero for an Internet
journal) and when subsidizing reading is not feasible (so that the first-best is not attain-
able), it is optimal to charge a zero subscription price. This reduces the number of readers
with respect to the first-best allocation, which in turn reduces the net social benefit from
publishing an article. Therefore the minimum quality standard is higher in the second-
best allocation than in the first-best. Note that the second-best allocation coincides with
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the Ramsey optimum as long as the marginal author’s benefit from publication is larger
than γ.19 Figure 2 describes the first-best and the second-best allocations.
Figure 2: The first-best (FB) and the second-best (SB) allocations.
The shaded area corresponds to the region pR ≥ 0 (non negative reader price).
5 Positive analysis
In this section, we adopt a positive viewpoint and analyze the consequences of the move
from reader-pays to open access for a not-for-profit journal run by an academic association.
If the objective of the association were to maximize social welfare, this move would lead
to the (second best) social optimum. However the association is likely to pursue its own
objective. We consider two possibilities for the objective function of the association: the
total utility of the readers20 (in this section) or the impact of the journal (in Section 7.2).
Our main result, that open- access is likely to lead to a decrease in the quality of academic
19In footnote 29, we give the condition under which the marginal author’s benefit from publication is
larger than γ for an open access not-for profit journal, in the case of iso-elastic distribution functions. We
also show later on that the journal’s quality is higher under the second-best than under the open access
not-for-profit journal. Thus, if the condition holds, the marginal author’s benefit is larger than γ in the
second-best as well.
20We here have in mind a situation in which the association maximizes its members’ utilities and
one becomes a member by subscribing to its journal. In a more general framework, the association
would internalize some fraction of authors’ utilities as well, since some members are also authors. Our
formulation here captures in a simple way the bias in the objective of the association toward the readers,
as compared with that of the social planner.
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journals, holds for both objective functions. We start (in Section 5.1) by explaining the
basic intuition behind this result, and then characterize formally the outcomes under
reader-pays (RP ) and open access (OA).
5.1 The basic intuition
Recall that the readership of the journal is determined by the indifference of the marginal
reader:
UR(nR : nA) ≡ [Qa(nA)− c(nR)]nA − pR = 0.
In the reader-pays model, the author fee is zero, and the budget breaking condition of
the journal is
pRnR ≥ γnA.
Eliminating pR between these two conditions, we obtain the inequality characterizing the
feasible set of the journal in the reader-pays model:
Qa(nA) ≥ c(nR) + γ
nR
. (19)
Note that the feasible set under open access (where pR = 0) corresponds to the same
condition where γ is set equal to 0 (since γ is recovered by author fees) and the inequality
is replaced by equality:
Qa(nA) = c(nR). (20)
Since γ > 0, we see that in order to attract the same number of readers, a RP journal
has to offer a higher quality than an OA journal. This is the basic intuition behind our
main result: the RP model imposes more discipline on quality choice.
Figure 3 below represents the two feasible sets and the indifference curves of the
association. Under fairly general conditions the optimal choice of the association will
entail higher quality (and possibly larger readership) under reader-pays than under open
access.
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Figure 3: The reader-pays (RP ) and the open-access (OA) allocations.
The dashed lines correspond to the indifference curves of the association.
The utility of the association increases in the direction of the arrows.
Of course, Figure 3 does not imply that open access always leads to a suboptimal level
of quality. In fact, as we already noted, open access is indeed second best optimal when
the association maximizes social welfare. This is why we now characterize formally the
outcomes of reader-pays and open access, in order to compare them with the first best
and second best outcomes. In this section, we consider that the association’s objective is
to maximize the sum of the readers’ utilities given by:
TUR =
∫ nR
0
{[Qa(nA)− c(y)]nA − pR} dy, (21)
where TUR means total utility of readers. Since nR and pR satisfy the indifference
condition of the marginal reader, i.e.
UR(nR : nA) = [Q
a(nA)− c(nR)]nA − pR = 0,
we can replace pR by [Q
a(nA)− c(nR)]nA in (21). We find:
TUR (nA, nR) ≡ nA
∫ nR
0
[c(nR)− c(y)] dy.
5.2 Reader-pays
As we already saw, the feasible set of a reader-pays journal is characterized by:
c(nR) +
γ
nR
≤ Qa(nA). (22)
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The left-hand side of (22) is U -shaped in nR. If its minimum is higher than the
maximum quality qmax, the feasible set is empty. We have therefore to assume that qmax
is large enough to avoid this problem. In this case, for a given nA, there may be two
values of nR that satisfy (22) with an equality: it is always optimal to choose the highest.
Therefore, the association maximizes TUR (nA, nR) with respect to (nA, nR) subject to
(22). Define LRP = TUR − λ2
[
nAc(nR)nR + γnA − nR
∫ nA
0
q(x)dx
]
where λ2 represents
the Lagrangian multiplier associated with (22). Then, the first-order conditions with
respect to nA and nR are given by:∫ nR
0
[c(nR)− c(y)] dy = λ2 [c(nR)nR + γ − nRq(nA)] , (23)
and:
nAnRc
′(nR) = λ2
[
nAc(nR) + nAc
′(nR)nR −
∫ nA
0
q(x)dx
]
. (24)
Since (22) is binding at the optimum, we have
c(nR)nR + γ = nRQ
a(nA). (RP )
From (RP ), (23) and (24), we obtain:
Ca(nR) = q(nA) +
γ
nR
[
Ca(nR)− c(nR)
nRc′(nR)
− 1
]
. (25)
Let
(
nRPA , n
RP
R
)
denote the association’s optimal choice under the reader-pays model. It
is characterized by (RP ) and (25). Since c′(nR) > 0 and Ca(nR) < c(nR), (25) implies
that Ca(nR) < q(nA). Similarly, (RP) implies that Q
a(nA) > c(nR).
Proposition 3 (not-for-profit and reader-pays) Consider a not-for-profit journal run by
an association maximizing the total utility of its readers. Under reader-pays, the allocation
chosen by the association
(
nRPA , n
RP
R
)
is characterized by (RP ) and (25). In particular:
• the average quality of published articles is higher than the reading cost of the marginal
reader, and
• the average reading cost is lower than the quality of the marginal article.
5.3 Open access
Before studying open access, we note first that in our model, the association maximizing
readers’ utilities prefers open access to reader-pays as long as the marginal author’s benefit
from publication is larger than γ.21 The association can at least choose the same quality
21In footnote 29, we give the condition that makes the marginal author’s benefit under open access
larger than γ, in the case of the iso-elastic distribution functions.
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standard that is chosen under reader-pays: then the move to open access increases the
number of readers and hence increases the sum of readers’ utilities.22 This argument also
shows that the association prefers open access to any hybrid model in which the journal
combines author fees with a positive subscription price.
We now consider open-access (pR = 0). This, together with UR(nR : nA) = 0 implies:
c(nR)nA =
∫ nA
0
q(x)dx. (OA)
The association maximizes TUR (nA, nR) with respect to (nA, nR, pA) subject to (OA),
the budget breaking (BB) constraint:
(pA − γ)nA ≥ 0, (BB)
and the authors’ participation constraint:
UA(nA : nR) = αAq(nA)nR + u− pA ≥ 0. (PCA)
Note that pA does not appear in the objective of the association. Without loss of general-
ity, we assume that the association selects the lowest price that is compatible with (BB),
namely pA = γ. In what follows, we study the association’s choice of (nA, nR) assuming
that (PCA) is slack at pA = γ.
Define LOA = TUR− λ3
[
c(nR)nA −
∫ nA
0
q(x)dx
]
where λ3 represents the Lagrangian
multiplier associated with (OA). Then, the first-order conditions with respect to nA and
nR are given by: ∫ nR
0
[c(nR)− c(y)] dy = λ3 [c(nR)− q(nA)] ; (26)
nAnRc
′(nR) = λ3nAc′(nR). (27)
From (26) and (27), we obtain:
q(nA) =
∫ nR
0
c(y)dy
nR
(≡ Ca(nR)). (28)
Let
(
nOAA , n
OA
R
)
denote the association’s optimal choice under open access. It is charac-
terized by (OA) and (28). (OA) means that the average quality is equal to the reading
cost of the marginal reader. In a somewhat symmetric fashion, condition (28) means that
the average reading cost Ca(nR) is equal to the quality of the marginal author’s article.
22However, we do not expect all incumbent journals to switch to the open access model in the real world
because of the budget constraint of authors (which we did not model for simplicity). As Dewatripont
et al. (2006) argue, unless a level-playing field is created for open access journals (in comparison with
reader-pay journals), which requires policy makers to provide funding for publication costs, it seems
infeasible that a large number of existing journals simultaneously move to open access.
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Proposition 4 (not-for-profit and open-access) Consider a not-for-profit journal run by
an academic association maximizing the total utility of its readers. Under open-access
the allocation
(
nOAA , n
OA
R
)
optimally chosen by the association is characterized by two
conditions:
• the average quality of published articles is equal to the reading cost of the marginal
reader, and
• the average reading cost is equal to the quality of the marginal article.
6 Comparison of all four cases
In this section, we compare four scenarios (first-best, second-best, not-for-profit journal
with open-access, not-for-profit journal with reader-pays) in terms of average quality of
the articles published in the journal and number of readers. To facilitate the comparison,
we choose a particular specification, that we call “iso-elastic”:23
q(nA) = qmax [1− (nA)εq ] and c(nR) = cmax (nR)εc .
In our iso-elastic specification we have:
Qa(nA) =
εqqmax + q(nA)
1 + εq
and
Ca(nR) =
c(nR)
1 + εc
.
6.1 Average quality
Proposition 5 (average quality): Consider a not-for-profit journal run by an academic
association maximizing the total utility of its readers. In the case of iso-elastic distribu-
tions, we have:
Qa(nRPA ) > Q
a(nSBA ) > Q
a(nFBA ) > Q
a(nOAA ).
The association chooses too high a quality standard under the reader-pays model and too
low a quality standard under open-access.
23The specification q(nA) = Kn
−εq
A would not work, since it would imply q(0) = +∞, and hence
unbounded article qualities.
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Proof. See the appendix.
Note that QaOA and QaRP depend neither on the externality parameter α nor on
authors’ fixed benefit u since the association does not internalize them. Furthermore,
under open access, γ has no impact on the quality choice of the association since there
are (by assumption) sufficiently many authors who are willing to pay pA = γ to publish
their articles: the participation constraint of authors is not binding. But the social planner
internalizes the net publication cost γ−u. Therefore, as long as γ−u is positive, because
of the lack of budgetary discipline, the association publishes too many articles under
open-access: QaOA < QaSB.
Under the reader-pays model, the association has to recover γ by charging the sole
readers. By contrast, what matters for the social planner is γ−u. This, together with the
fact that the association does not internalize the authors’ benefit, makes the reader-pays
association publish too few articles compared with the second-best: QaRP > QaSB.
The intuition for why the change from reader-pays to open access induces a quality
degradation can be given in two steps. First, given the quality standard chosen under the
reader-pays model qmin = q(n
RP
A ), the move to open access increases the number of readers
to n′R determined by c(n
′
R) = Q
a(nRPA ). Second, in the case of iso-elastic distributions,
the condition q(nRPA ) > C
a(n′R) holds, which implies that the association finds it optimal
to lower the standard to publish more articles. Basically, the reader-pays model imposes
too much discipline on quality because of the need to recover γ while the open access
model imposes too little discipline since γ is financed with author fees.
6.2 Readership size
We now compare readership size in the four regimes. First, comparing the first-best
outcome with the second-best, we find:
cSB < cFB,
which implies nFBR > n
SB
R . Furthermore, under open-access the marginal reader is de-
termined by the average quality of articles (i.e. Qa = c(nR)). Since, by Proposition 5,
the average quality is higher under the second-best than with an open-access association,
readership size is larger in the former than in the latter. Therefore, we have:
nFBR > n
SB
R > n
OA
R .
We now compare the policy of an open-access association with that of a reader-pays
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association in terms of readership size. The comparison gives
nOAR  nRPR if and only if εq 
1
1 + εc
.
If εq >
1
1+εc
, the change from the reader-pays model to the open-access increases the
readership size of the journal run by the association, as could have been expected. But
a rather surprising result holds if εq <
1
1+εc
: in this case open-access reduces readership
size. This occurs because even though readers do not pay for subscription, the average
quality of the journal becomes very low under open access. Basically, there is a conflict
between low cost readers and high cost readers over the choice of quality standard: the
former prefers a low standard while the latter prefers a high standard. When εq <
1
1+εc
,
the conflict is severe24 and hence resolving the conflict in favor of low cost readers by
lowering quality standard induces many high cost readers to stop reading the journal.
Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 6 (readership size): Consider a not-for-profit journal run by an academic
association maximizing the total utility of its readers. In the case of iso-elastic distribu-
tions, we have:
nFBR > n
SB
R > n
OA
R .
The journal attracts too few readers under the open-access model. Moreover:
nOAR  nRPR if and only if εq 
1
1 + εc
.
The change from the reader-pays model to the open-access model increases the reader-
ship of the journal if εq >
1
1+εc
and reduces it if εq <
1
1+εc
.
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the allocations chosen by the association under open access
and under reader-pays together with the second-best allocation.
24For instance, a small εc means that a small change in c creates a large change in nR. Therefore,
as εc decreases, a given quality degradation, that induces a decrease in the marginal c through Qa = c,
induces a larger reduction in nR.
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Figure 4: The allocations chosen by a not-for-profit journal
when εq <
1
1+εc
(OA: open-access, RP : reader-pays).
Figure 5: The allocations chosen by a not-for-profit journal
when εq >
1
1+εc
(OA: open-access, RP : reader-pays).
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6.3 Social welfare
In this subsection, we compare the reader-pays model with the open access model in terms
of social welfare, when the journal’s objective is to maximize the sum of readers’ utilities.
Consider the special case εq =
1
1+εc
in which, as seen from Proposition 6, the number of
readers remains the same (i.e. nRPR = n
OA
R = nR). Then, from section 3, we have:
∂W
∂nA
= (1 + α)nRq(nA)− (γ − u)− nRCa(nR).
Under open access, Ca(nR) = q(n
OA
A ) holds. Then, from the participation constraint of
the marginal author, we have u+αAnRq(n
OA
A ) ≥ γ. Plugging these two conditions into the
above first-order derivative shows that increasing the number of accepted papers increases
social welfare (i.e. ∂W
∂nA
> 0 for nA = n
OR
A ). This in turn implies that the open access
model dominates the reader-pays model in terms of social welfare.
Consider now the case in which the number of readers is larger under open access than
under the reader-pays model (i.e., εq >
1
1+εc
holds). Then, we can also prove that the open
access model dominates the reader-pays model. We proceed in two steps. First, suppose
that the move from open access to reader-pays does not change the number of readers.
Then, we know from the previous argument that W (nOAA , n
OA
R ) > W (n
RP
A , n
OA
R ). Second,
when we keep the quality standard (hence the number of papers accepted) constant at
q(nRPA ), W (n
RP
A , n
OA
R ) > W (n
RP
A , n
RP
R ) must hold: since open access is second-best optimal
for any given quality standard and the number of readers under open access is smaller
when the quality standard is q(nOAA ) than when it is q(n
RP
A ), the reduction in number of
readers from nOAR to n
RP
R when the standard is fixed at q(n
RP
A ) reduces social welfare.
Finally, when εq <
1
1+εc
, the change from reader-pays to open access reduces the
number of readers. In this case, we cannot obtain a general result. However, we have
performed analytical computations25 and simulations26 suggesting that open access is
likely to dominate the reader-pays model in terms of social welfare as long as the marginal
author’s participation constraint is slack under open access.
Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 7 Consider a not-for-profit journal maximizing the sum of readers’ payoffs.
In the case of iso-elastic distributions, as long as open access does not lead to a significant
25For instance, the Taylor expansion of W around γ = 0 shows that open access dominates the reader-
pays model in terms of social welfare. Computations are available from the authors.
26In fact, simulations show that as εq decreases, the relative performance of reader-pays over open
access in terms of social welfare improves.
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reduction in terms of readership, the open access model leads to a higher social welfare
than the reader-pays model.
7 Robustness
In this section, we show that our main result (open access can lead to quality degradation)
is robust in the case of the two-sided pricing model where both authors and readers pay
and when the journal maximizes impact: the analysis of the for-profit journal is relegated
to the Appendix.
7.1 The two-sided pricing model
In this section, we consider the case in which the journal cannot recover the entire pub-
lication cost through author fees because of the authors’ budget constraint and hence
study the transition from the reader-pays model to the two-sided pricing model in which
the journal complements author fees with a positive subscription price. Let B(< γ) be
the maximum amount authors can pay. Under the two-sided pricing model, the journal
charges an author fee equal to B and recovers (γ −B)nA through a subscription price:
pRnR = (γ −B)nA.
Let γ′ ≡ γ − B. Then, the two-sided pricing model is equivalent to a reader-pays model
in which γ is replaced by γ′. Hence, we need to know how the quality standard un-
der the reader-pays model changes as γ decreases. In the appendix, we show that this
quality standard decreases as γ decreases in the case of iso-elastic distribution functions.
Summarizing we have:
Proposition 8 Consider a not-for-profit journal maximizing the sum of readers’ utilities
in the case of iso-elastic distribution functions. When each author is budget constrained
and can afford to pay at most a fee B(< γ), the move from the reader-pays model to the
two-sided pricing model:
(i) always induces a quality degradation.
(ii) also reduces the number of readers if εq <
1
1+εc
.
Proof. See the appendix.
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7.2 Impact-maximizing journal
Maximizing the utility of readers is a reasonable objective for a reader-pays (not-for-
profit) journal, since readers are also the members of the association that controls the
journal. However this objective may seem less natural for an open-access journal. Thus
the move from reader-pays to open-access may be accompanied by a change in objective.
To account for this possibility, and as a robustness check, we consider now an alternative
objective for the journal. We assume that it endeavors to maximize its impact, measured
by the sum of all readers’ benefit from reading the journal:
IM(nA, nR) ≡ nR
∫ nA
0
q(y)dy.
IM is proportional to the number of citations of the article, or to the number of patents
derived from it.
The association maximizes IM(nA, nR) with respect to (nA, nR, pA) subject to (OA),
the budget breaking constraint (BB) and the authors’ participation constraint (PCA):
c(nR)nA =
∫ nA
0
q(x)dx; (OA)
(pA − γ)nA ≥ 0 (BB)
UA(nA : nR) = αAq(nA)nR + u− pA ≥ 0. (PCA)
As before, pA does not appear in the objective of the association. Without loss of general-
ity, we assume that the association selects the lowest price that is compatible with (BB),
namely pA = γ. In what follows, we study the association’s choice of (nA, nR) assuming
that (PCA) is slack at pA = γ.
Define LIM,OA = IM(nA, nR) − λ4
[
c(nR)nA −
∫ nA
0
q(x)dx
]
where λ4 represents the
Lagrangian multiplier associated with (OA). Appendix shows that the allocation chosen
by the impact-maximizing organization under open access, denoted by
(
nIM,OAA , n
IM,OA
R
)
,
is characterized by (29) and (OA).
q(nA) =
c(nR)
1 + nRc
′(nR)
c(nR)
. (29)
Furthermore, in the iso-elastic case, this allocation coincides with the allocation chosen
by an open-access journal maximizing the utility of its readers. Indeed condition (28)
(marginal quality equals average readers cost) coincides in this case with condition (29),
since:
Ca(nR) =
1
nR
∫ nR
0
c(y)dy =
c(nR)
1 + εc
=
c(nR)
1 + nRc
′(nR)
c(nR)
.
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Proposition 9 (i) Under open access, the allocation chosen by an impact-maximizing
journal
(
nIM,OAA , n
IM,OA
R
)
is characterized by (OA) and (29).
(ii) In the case of iso-elastic distributions, this allocation coincides with the allocation
chosen by a journal who maximizes the utility of its readers.
Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 9 shows the robustness of our main conclusion, at least in the iso-elastic
case. Independently of whether the journal maximizes its impact or the utility of its
readers, it chooses the same quality standard, which is below the socially efficient level.
8 Concluding remarks
We showed that for an electronic academic journal, social welfare maximization implies
open access given that subscription prices cannot be negative. This is because the mar-
ginal cost of distribution is zero, while readers exert positive externalities on the rest of
society. We also examined the consequences of a move from the reader-pays model to
the open-access model by considering journals run by not-for-profit associations or by for-
profit publishers. The reader-pays model imposes too much discipline on quality since the
journal has to recover publication costs from subscription fees and the journal does not in-
ternalize the positive externalities on authors and society. Under open access, a for-profit
journal does not internalize reading costs and hence can have an incentive to publish low
quality articles to increase its profit from author fees. What is rather surprising is that
the move to open access may generate quality degradation even for a not-for-profit journal
maximizing readers’ payoffs (and hence internalizing reading costs). The basic intuition
is simple: under open access, the association does not internalize the cost of publication
(which is covered by author fees) while a social-welfare maximizing journal internalizes
this (net of authors’ fixed benefit from publication). Furthermore, quality degradation
can even make the number of readers smaller under open access than with the reader-pays
model. This happens when publishing too many articles induces a large number of high
cost readers to stop reading the journal. However, as long as open access does not reduce
readership, we find that the open access model unambiguously gives higher social welfare
than the reader-pays model, in the case of a not-for profit journal maximizing readers’
utilities.
Even though we did not model library subscriptions under the reader-pays model, our
main results seem to be robust to the introduction of this feature, as long as we maintain
the assumption that the journal charges a uniform subscription price. Note first that
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library subscription plays no role under open access. Under reader-pays model, as a first
approximation, we can reinterpret a reader in our model as a group of readers for which
a library makes the subscription decision. Then, a library will subscribe only if the total
benefit of its group is larger than the sum of the subscription price and the total reading
cost of its group. Hence, library subscription decisions would also impose some discipline
on the quality standard of the reader-pays model.
It would be interesting to extend our analysis to the case in which the journal can
signal the quality of an accepted article by giving it one among several ratings. For
instance, some B.E. journals in economics give one among three quality ratings (Advances,
Contributions, Topics).27
There are other interesting issues to study regarding open access journals. One of
them is to know how the change in the pricing model affects competition among journals.
There is a “bottleneck argument”28 according to which the change from reader-pays to
open access would promote competition. Indeed, once articles are published in journals,
each journal is a bottleneck and has a monopoly power on its content; however, at the
submission stage (i.e. prior to publication) journals are substitutes and compete for
attracting authors. A formal modeling of the consequence of open access on authors’
submission policies, together with readers’ choices, could provide interesting insights into
this ”bottleneck argument”.
27The simple model we considered at the end of Appendix to analyze a for-profit journal shows that
publishing some low quality articles together with high quality articles can be socially optimal when
articles generate large positive externalities on the society. In this case, completely revealing each article’s
quality reduces social welfare since then readers will read only high quality articles.
28For instance, Dewatripont et al. (2006, p.67): “there are two (non conflicting) theoretical possibilities
for increasing price competition in the market: shift price competition to a level where journals are viewed
as substitute rather than complement or make researchers and users more price sensitive”.
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Appendix
Characterization of all four outcomes in the case of iso-elastic distributions
In what follows, we characterize all four outcomes (the first-best, the second-best, the
allocations chosen by the association maximizing readers’ payoffs under reader-pays and
under open access) in the case of iso-elastic distributions.
1. The first-best allocation:
The first-best allocation is characterized by two conditions:
(1 + α)q(nA) =
γ − u
nR
+ Ca(nR), (8)
and
(1 + α)
∫ nA
0
q(x)dx = nAc(nR). (9)
Condition (8), expressed in terms of (q, c) leads to:
(1 + α)q =
(γ − u)(cmax)1/εc
c1/εc
+
c
1 + εc
. (30)
Condition (9), expressed in terms of the same variables leads to:
(1 + α) [εqqmax + q] = (1 + εq)c. (31)
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Substracting (30) from (31) leads to:(
εq +
εc
1 + εc
)
c− (γ − u)(cmax)
1/εc
c1/εc
= (1 + α)εqqmax. (32)
Let ΦFB(c) ≡
(
εq +
εc
1+εc
)
c − γ−u
c1/εc
. Since ΦFB(c) increases from ΦFB(0) = −∞ to
ΦFB(+∞) = +∞, there is a unique solution to (32), denoted cFB ≡ c(nFBR ). Replacing c
by (1 + α)Qa (this results from (9)) into (32) and dividing (32) by (1 + α) gives:(
εq +
εc
1 + εc
)
Qa − (γ − u)(cmax)
1/εc
(1 + α)1+1/εc(Qa)1/εc
= εqqmax. (33)
QaFB ≡ Qa(nFBA ) is the unique solution of (33).
2. The second-best allocation:
It is characterized by two conditions:
(1 + α)q(nA) =
(γ − u)
nR
+
∫ nR
0
c(y)dy
nR
+
αc(nR)
nRc′(nR)
[c(nR)− q(nA)] (17)
and
c(nR) = Q
a(nA). (18)
After replacing nRc
′(nR) = εcc(nR) into (17) and expressing everything in terms of
(q, c), we obtain:
(1 + α +
α
εc
)q =
(γ − u)(cmax)1/εc
c1/εc
+
c
1 + εc
+
αc
εc
,
from which we get:
q =
(γ − u)(cmax)1/εc(
1 + α + α
εc
)
c1/εc
+
c
1 + εc
(34)
Since q = (1 + εq)Q
a − εqqmax = (1 + εq)c− εqqmax (the latter equality results from (18)),
condition (34) becomes:(
εq +
εc
1 + εc
)
c− (γ − u)(cmax)
1/εc
(1 + α + α
εc
)c1/εc
= εqqmax. (35)
cSB
(≡ c(nSBR )) is the unique solution of (35). Furthermore, we have cSB = QaSB ≡
Qa(nSBA ).
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3. Reader-pays:
The allocation chosen under the reader-pays model is characterized by two conditions:
c(nR) +
γ
nR
= Qa(nA), (RP )
and
Ca(nR) = q(nA) +
γ
nR
[
Ca(nR)− c(nR)
nRc′(nR)
− 1
]
. (30)
Since c = cmaxn
εc
R , (RP ) is equivalent to
Qa = c +
γ(cmax)
1/εc
c1/εc
. (36)
If we express (25) as a function of c, using Ca = 1
1+εc
c, q = (1 + εq)Q
a − εqqmax and (36),
we get:
c
1 + εc
= (1 + εq)
[
c +
γ(cmax)
1/εc
c1/εc
]
− εqqmax + γ(cmax)
1/εc
c1/εc
[ c
1+εc
− c
εcc
− 1
]
,
and after simplifications:(
εq +
εc
1 + εc
)
c− γ(cmax)
1/εc( 1
1+εc
− εq)
c1/εc
= εqqmax. (37)
For the comparison with open access in terms of readership, we also write the following
equation, which is equivalent to (37):
(
εq +
εc
1 + εc
)
c +
γ
nR
(εq − 1
1 + εc
) = εqqmax.
4. Open access:29
The allocation chosen by a not-for-profit journal under open-access is characterized
by two conditions:
(OA) c(nR)nA =
∫ nA
0
q(x)dx.
29In the case of the iso-elastic distribution functions, the marginal author’s benefit under open access
is larger than γ if the following condition holds:
αA
1 + εc
[
εq
εq + εc1+εc
qmax
] 1+εc
εc
> (γ − u) (cmax)
1
εc .
Note that this condition holds if qmax or αA is large enough or cmax is small enough.
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and
q(nA) =
∫ nR
0
c(y)dy
nR
(≡ Ca(nR)). (25)
From q = (1 + εq)Q
a − εqqmax, (28) becomes
(1 + εq)Q
a − εqqmax = c
1 + εc
(38)
Replacing c with Qa in (38) gives QaOA:(
εq +
εc
1 + εc
)
QaOA = εqqmax. (39)
Proof of Proposition 5
When we replace c with Qa in (35), compare it with (33), and use the fact that
(1 + α)1+1/εc > (1 + α + α
εc
), we find:
QaSB > QaFB.
It is easy to compare the first-best allocation with the allocation chosen by an open-
access association in terms of average quality. Indeed, comparing (33) with (39) tells us
immediately that:
QaFB > QaOA.
We now compare the second-best allocation with the reader-pays outcome, again in
terms of average quality. Replacing c with Qa− γ(cmax)1/εc
c1/εc
into the first term of (37) gives(
εq +
εc
1 + εc
)(
Qa − γ(cmax)
1/εc
c1/εc
)
− γ(cmax)
1/εc
c1/εc
(
1
1 + εc
− εq
)
=
(
εq +
εc
1 + εc
)
Qa − γ(cmax)
1/εc
[c˜(Qa)]1/εc
= εqqmax, (40)
where c˜(Qa) is the largest c that satisfies (36). This function is defined for
Qa > min
c
[
c +
γ(cmax)
1/εc
c1/εc
]
.
As already mentioned, we assume that qmax is large enough for this set to be non empty.
In this case, QaRP is determined by (40). Qa > c˜(Qa) implies(
εq +
εc
1 + εc
)
Qa − γ(cmax)
1/εc
(Qa)1/εc
>
(
εq +
εc
1 + εc
)
Qa − γ(cmax)
1/εc
[c˜(Qa)]1/εc
. (41)
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Let Q˜a denote the solution of(
εq +
εc
1 + εc
)
Qa − γ(cmax)
1/εc
(Qa)1/εc
= εqqmax. (42)
Note that the left hand side of (41) increases with Qa, while the right hand side equals
εqqmax when Q
a = QaRP , by condition (40). Then, (40) and (41) imply that Q˜a < QaRP .
Comparing (42) with (35) (and in the latter condition, replacing c with Qa) leads to
Q˜a > QaSB, which in turn implies QaRP > QaSB. Since we know that QaSB > QaFB, we
have finally:
QaRP > QaSB > QaFB > QaOA.
Proof of Proposition 8
Since the two-sided pricing model is equivalent to a reader-pays model in which γ is
replaced by γ′(< γ), we examine below how the quality standard under the reader-pays
model changes as γ decreases. Consider first the case with εq ≥ 11+εc . We suppose that γ
strictly decreases and that Qa weakly increases and find a contradiction. Note first that
these two conditions imply that c strictly increases. This is because c is the maximum
value satisfying
(RP) Qa = c +
γ(cmax)
1/εc
c1/εc
.
After substituting γ(cmax)
1/εc
c1/εc
with Qa − c into the following equation, which characterizes
the optimal Qa: (
εq +
εc
1 + εc
)
Qa − γ(cmax)
1/εc
c1/εc
= εqqmax,
we find: (
εq − 1
1 + εc
)
Qa + c = εqqmax.
Since the L.H.S. of the above equation strictly increases but the R.H.S. remains un-
changed, we have a contradiction. Therefore, the move to the two-sided pricing case
generates quality degradation as long as εq >
1
1+εc
.
Consider now εq <
1
1+εc
. From the following equation that characterizes the optimal
nR, (
εq +
εc
1 + εc
)
cmaxn
εc
R +
γ
nR
(
εq − 1
1 + εc
)
= εqqmax
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we find
dnR
dγ
=
−
(
εq − 11+εc
)
[(
εq +
εc
1+εc
)
εccmaxn
εc
R − γnR
(
εq − 11+εc
)] > 0.
This implies that as γ decreases, the number of readers nR (and hence c(nR)) strictly
decreases. However, from (RP), c cannot decrease if γ decreases and Qa weakly increases.
Therefore, Qa must strictly decrease.
Proof of Proposition 9
The first-order conditions with respect to nA and nR are given by:
nRq(nA) = λ4 [c(nR)− q(nA)] ; (43)∫ nA
0
q(y)dy = λ4nAc
′(nR). (44)
(44) is equivalent to
λ4 =
∫ nA
0
q(y)dy
nAc′(nR)
> 0. (45)
Replacing λ4 in (43) with the expression in (45) gives:
nRq(nA)c
′(nR) = Qa(nA) [c(nR)− q(nA)] . (46)
Since (OA) is binding, we have that Qa(nA) = c(nR). Rearranging (46) gives (29).
Analysis of a For-profit Journal
As another robustness check, we consider here the case of a for-profit journal. Since
this case is more complex, we use a simpler version of our model in which all readers
are homogenous and have the same reading cost per article c > 0. As before, authors
differ in terms of the quality of their article, but the distribution of qualities is now
Bernoulli: a fraction ν of authors have articles of high quality, denoted by qH , and a
fraction 1 − ν of authors have articles of low quality, denoted by qL ∈ (0, qH). We
introduce two assumptions:
A1: νqH + (1− ν)qL < c.
A2: (qH − c) > γ and u + αAqH > γ
A1 says that if all articles are accepted, the average quality is lower than the reading
cost, which implies that no reader reads the journal. In other words, A1 means that
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the certification service provided by the journal is essential. A2 says that if the journal
publishes only high-quality articles, the journal is viable both under the reader-pays model
and under the open-access model. More precisely, if all readers read a high quality article,
under reader-pays, the sum of readers’ net benefits from reading it is larger than the
publication cost and, under open access, the author’s benefit is larger than the publication
cost.
The journal’s editorial policy consists of the probability of accepting a high-quality
article, denoted by βH , and the probability of accepting a low-quality article, denoted by
βL, where a low-quality article can be published (i.e. βL > 0) only if βH = 1. Equivalently,
this editorial policy can be interpreted in terms of the minimum quality standard qmin
and the number of articles to publish nA with prioritization of high quality articles. To
simplify our analysis, we assume that the refereeing cost is zero and hence the submission
fee is zero.
1. Benchmark: Second best:
We study the social optimum under the constraint that the social planner cannot force
a reader to read the journal when the average quality of the journal is below the reading
cost. From A2, all high-quality articles should be published (i.e. βH = 1). Regarding βL,
let βL be defined by
νqH + (1− ν)βLqL
ν + (1− ν)βL
≡ c,
which is equivalent to:
(1− ν)β¯L(c− qL) = ν(qH − c).
According to A1 and A2, such βL exists and βL ∈ (0, 1). It is not optimal to choose
βL > βL since in this case the journal will not be read. For βL ≤ βL, social welfare from
publishing low quality articles is given by
SWL(βL) = (1− ν)βL [(1 + α)qL − (γ − u)− c] .
If a low-quality article is published, the gain to society is u+(1+α)qL while society incurs
the publication cost γ and the reading cost c. Therefore, βL = βL is optimal if and only
if u + (1 + α)qL ≥ γ + c: otherwise, βL = 0 is optimal.
2. Reader-pays:
Consider now a reader-pays for-profit journal. Define the average quality of the journal
as follows:
Qa(βH , βL) ≡ νβHqH + (1− ν)βLqL
νβH + (1− ν)βL
The profit is zero if the average quality is lower than the reading cost. Otherwise, the maxi-
mum price that the journal can charge a reader for subscription is [νβH + (1− ν)βL] (Qa − c).
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Therefore, the profit is given by
ΠRP (βH , βL) = [νβH + (1− ν)βL] [Qa(βH , βL)− c− γ]
= [νβHqH + (1− ν)βLqL]− [νβH + (1− ν)βL] (c + γ)
Profit maximization leads to βH = 1 from A2 and βL = 0 from A1.
3. Open Access:
Consider now an open access for-profit journal. As before, the profit is zero if the
average quality is lower than the reading cost. Otherwise, the maximum price that the
journal can charge for publication is u + αAqH if βL = 0 or u + αAqL if βL > 0. Hence,
if u + αAqL ≤ γ, the journal will not publish any low quality articles (i.e. βL = 0) and
will choose βH = 1 from A2; this outcome is equivalent to the one under the reader-pays
for-profit journal. When u + αAqL > γ, conditional on βL > 0, profit maximization leads
to βL = βL (and βH = 1). In this case, we need to compare the profit obtained when
(βH , βL) = (1, 0) with the one obtained when (βH , βL) = (1, βL). The difference between
the two is
ν (u + αAqH − γ)−
[
ν + (1− ν)βL
]
(u + αAqL − γ)
= ναA (qH − qL)− (1− ν)βL (u + αAqL − γ)
Therefore, the journal chooses (βH , βL) = (1, βL) if and only if
u− γ + αAqL ≥ ναA (qH − qL)
(1− ν)βL
=
αA (qH − qL) (c− qL)
(qH − c) .
Otherwise, the journal chooses (βH , βL) = (1, 0).
Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 10 Under A1-A2, (i) high quality articles are always published under any
of the three cases: second-best, reader-pays for-profit, open access for-profit.
(ii) As for low quality articles:
a. In the second best outcome, βL = βL is optimal if and only if u−γ+(1+α)qL ≥ c:
otherwise, βL = 0 is optimal.
b. A reader-pays for-profit journal always chooses βL = 0.
c. An open access for-profit journal chooses βL = βL if and only if
u− γ + αAqL ≥ αA (qH − qL) (c− qL)
(qH − c) .
Otherwise, it chooses βL = 0.
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Corollary 1 (i) The quality standard chosen by a reader-pays for-profit journal is (weakly)
higher than both the one chosen by an open-access for-profit journal and the second best
quality standard. Therefore, the change from the reader-pays model to open access (weakly)
creates quality degradation.
(ii) If c is larger than u−γ+(1+α)qL, the quality standard chosen by an open access
for-profit journal is (weakly) lower than the second best standard.
A reader-pays for-profit journal has no interest in publishing low quality articles since
including any low quality article only reduces readers’ willingness to pay for the subscrip-
tion. However, publishing a low quality article may be socially desirable when the positive
externalities on the society are large enough. Therefore, a reader-pays for profit journal
tends to have too high a standard since it does not internalize these externalities. On
the contrary, an open access for-profit journal does not internalize readers’ reading costs
as long as the average quality of the journal is larger than the reading cost per article
c. Therefore, it may have an incentive to degrade the quality by publishing low quality
articles until the average quality of the journal becomes equal to c. This quality degra-
dation is profitable as long as the positive effect from publishing more articles dominates
the negative effect from reducing the author fee (since an author’s benefit is larger when
publishing a high-quality article than when publishing a low quality article). Therefore,
if publishing low quality articles is not socially desirable because of a high c, the change
from the reader-pays model to open access weakly creates quality degradation.
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